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There is a social process by which what have been virtues in one 
social context can become vices in another. 
Alasdair MacIntyre l 
I. The Temptation of Technology 
Advances in technology challenge traditional values because they invite 
action. This is especially the case with contemporary medical technology, 
where the allure of its promises makes difficult limiting its applications. A 
paradigm example is provided by intensive care units (ICUs) in cases 
where further treatment can often postpone death only marginally. Given 
the prima facie obligation to preserve life, such treatment often appears 
obligatory, despite the high monetary and psycho-social costs and the 
meager benefits offered to particular groups of patients.2 However, 
increasing health care costs and expanding technological capacities are 
evidence that limits must be established, if the commitment to preserve 
human life is not to become an idolatry of technology.) The challenge is 
cultural: prudently to apply the means which modern technology makes 
available . If limits cannot be set to the obligation to use expensive life-
saving treatment, then the virtue of helping others save their lives will 
become the vice of an idolatrous pursuit of physical life to the neglect of 
more important goods. 
The failuire to set limits poses two genre of problems. The first is moral. 
The duty to preserve life in technological societies tends to become all-
consuming, so much so that it can overwhelm a proper balance with other 
duties, including the weightier ones of sustaining the moral well-being of 
patients and their families . This has often been described as the 
technological imperative, the perceived moral obligation to use all 
available technology regardless of costs, even moral costS.4 The second 
genre is economic. The technological imperative supports outlays of 
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health care resources which involve major costs, but deliver litle in return. 
The economic dimension has its own moral implications: waste is wrong, 
the more so if other morally worthwhile medical goals lose the resources 
needed to achieve them. The difficulty is that many physicians, and much 
of the health care profession, have become enamored of interventions that 
are high in cost and low in yield to the detriment of interventions that are 
low in cost and high in yield. It is much more exciting to talk about 
intensive care than about well-baby care and anti-smoking campaigns. 
II. The Tradition's Answer 
The Catholic Church faced this set of problems for the first time 400 
years ago. Though from our perspective the 16th and 17th centuries may 
not appear to have been a period of scientific advance and medical 
possibility, it was experienced as an era of major change and dramatic 
promise. It was in the 16th century, for example, with the publication of 
Vesalius's De humani corporis Jabrica, that anatomy as we know it 
emerged. s Progress was such that Descartes could hope that medicine 
would allow him to live past the age of 100.6 However, many of the 
therapeutic approaches of the time were costly, not only in monetary 
terms, but in surgery without the benefit of anesthesia, not to mention 
bleeding, blistering, clystering, purging, and leeching. The question 
naturally arose as to whether there are limits to the obligation to accept 
such treatment, even if it offers the possibility of restoring health. 
Catholic theologians of the time answered by distinguishing between 
obligatory and non-obligatory treatment, that is, between treatment 
involving ordinary means versus extraordinary means . The view was that 
the duty to preserve life must be limited by those circumstances which 
would render the virtue of preserving life into the vice of doing so at all 
costs , thus endangering the moral life of the patient and others. 
Extraordinary means are those which are disproportionate and , therefore, 
potentially immoderate. The rationale for the distinction is one of properly 
ordering the demands of competing obligations: that of preserving life 
vis-a-vis those of realizing other goods - societal, familial , intellectual, 
aesthetic, moral, religious , even athletic - that contribute to a full 
flourishing of life. Accordingly, one may licitly forebear from means to 
preserve life not only when the means are futile , but also when they are 
intemperate. 
The language here is not of rights, i.e. , claims to the means to preserve 
life. Rather, the focus is upon the virtues , and more precisely, upon those 
which are required to temper the claims of medicine and to understand 
where and how what is usually a virtue, saving lives , can become vicious. 
There are other goods, e.g., the salvation of one's soul, pursuit of which 
should also shape our habits and character. To overstress preserving life is 
to neglect the goods which make life valuable, and to forego cultivating the 
virtues to realize them. The distinction between ordinary and extra-
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ordinary means , therefore, supports those virtues which are required to 
limit the claims of medicine. 
This can be seen in the considerations considered in the distinction. The 
first is whether the treatment is customary. One is obligated to preserve life 
and health only with means commonly used in the circumstances -
common nutrition, common medicines, common medical procedures. 7 
Such is the case because, if the obligation to preserve life and health 
extended to uncommon means, e.g., unusual nutrition, medicines, 
procedures, one would overexaggerate the importance of preserving 
physical life. "[T]he good of this life is not held to be of so great an import," 
J oannes de Lugo (d. 1546) observes , "that its preservation must be effected 
by extraordinary diligence: it is one thing not to neglect it and throw it 
away rashly, to which a man is bound; it is another thing indeed to seek 
after it and to hold it back by hard-to-obtain [exquisitis] means as it is 
escaping from him, to which he is not held."8 The attempt to save one's life 
in this world at all costs tends to exclude the pursuit of other goods, e.g., 
saving one's immortal soul; it would therefore tend to distract from the 
exercise of the virtues ordained to achieve these goods. One is not 0 bliged 
to save one's own life, or that of others, if to try to do so will be seriously 
disorienting morally. 
The second consideration is burden. One is not obligated to employ 
usual means if the burden of their use is too great. The notion of the 
extraordinary was thus expanded beyond the concept of the unusual to 
incorporate the concept of an undue inconvenience. Excessive burdens are 
recognized as either financial, involving excessive costs (sumptus 
extraordinarius) or expensive means (media pretiosa), or involving major 
effort or indignity (summus labor, nimis dura), or physical (quodam 
cruciatus, ingens dolor) or psychological (vehemens horror) suffering. 9 
Moreover, they can be either relative to the circumstances of the individual 
(secundum proportionem status), or absolute. For a poor individual, 
relatively modest costs might impose an extraordinary burden. But there is 
such a thing as a cost which constitutes an extraordinary burden in its own 
terms, or absolutely, and this is not obligatory even if one can affrord it. IO 
The third consideration is likelihood of success. One is only obligated to 
use life-saving interventions. If they provide a spes salutis, a reasonable 
expectation of life and health. I I We shall explore this issue shortly by 
examining a recently devised clinimetric l2 , the APACHE scores, which 
provide some basis for determining the likelihood or expectation of 
recovery. However, the moral principle upon which practical applications 
rest has had traditional acceptance. 13 Spes salutis covers not only the 
probability of success, but also the quality and the length of the life which 
success conserves. Quality of life and length of life, then, are the final two 
considerations ingredient in the traditional distinction. There is no 
obligation to undergo debilitating surgery and! or amputation. 14 Nor is 
there an obligation to undergo treatment which simply delays the end of a 
fatal course of events. 15 
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In summary, the traditional distinction obliges one only to use means to 
preserve life and health which are usual in the circumstances, and to use 
them only if they both provide a reasonable expectation of health and do 
so with burdens not too great. The point is not just that one is excused from 
using extraordinary means, but that extraordinary means pose moral 
hazards. As Pius XII put it in his 1957 address on the limits of 0 bligations 
to provide treatment: 
one is normally held to use only ordinary means according to the circumstances 
of persons, places, times, and culture, that is to say, means that do not involve any 
extraordinary burden for oneself or another. A more strict obligation would be 
too heavy for most men and would render the attainment of the higher, more 
important good too difficult. Life, health, all temporal activities are in fact 
subordinated to spiritual ends. 16 
The traditional notion that one is only obligated to use ordinary means to 
preserve life permits one to appreciate that the good of living is not an 
absolute moral good, but one of a number of intrinsic goods, the pursuit of 
anyone of which must be balanced against the pursuit of others. FOLPius 
XII, it should be noted, this notion served not only to limit the obligation 
to accept treatment, but also to provide it. 17 If we make the preservation of 
life an overriding good, we turn the virtue of pursuing life into something 
VICIOUS. 
Gerald Kelly distinguishes betwen two morally correct standards for 
providing health care: "the strict, or extreme, professional standard", and 
the "moderate standard." 18 In following the former, the physician, 
although recognizing the right of the patient or his proxy to refuse 
extraordinary means to conserve his life, yet "insofar as the judgment is left 
to himself, ... simply keep[s] trying to prolong life right to the end ." In 
contrast, when following the moderate standard, "doctors try to effect a 
cure as long as there is any reasonable hope of doing so", but they "also 
think there is a point when such efforts become futile [and] ... the sole duty 
of the doctor is to see that the patient gets good nursing care and that his 
pain is alleviated." The moderate standard "is less likely to impose 
excessive burdens on the patient's relatives, who "often endure terrific 
strain and undergo great expense while life is being prolonged by artificial 
means."19 However, Kelly's remarks are confined to "paying patients."2o 
Consequently, Kelly fails to realize that, for a health care policy in which 
technology offers increasingly expensive options, and one in which the 
expenditures of third-party payers generate an ever increasing societal 
burden, the moderate standard is not simply one licit alternative.2l Rather, 
it is the only licit one, because of the obligation to avoid unrestricted 
expenditures which seriously burden third parties.22 
III. The Contemporary Importance of Traditions' Answer 
An appropriate appreciation of the non-absolute value of human 
physical life will not be derived from cost-effectiveness studies. Such 
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studies demonstrate only the cheapest way to achieve what one already 
wants , viz. , to save lives. But they do not address the moral question of 
when one should preserve life and at what cost. Such studies cannot ask 
what the good of preserving life is in relation to other goods, such as 
attaining eternal salvation, or realizing intellectual, aesthetic, or other 
values. In contrast, the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary 
provides the needed moral framework: indeed , it permits one to see that 
the duty to preserve life is not unconditional, that the good of living must 
not overshadow the good(s) that give life purpose and worth. the 
framework is also economically appropriate: it forces one to defend the 
relation between the burden of means (i.e., the economic and psychosocial 
costs) and the prospects of cure. 
The absence of a temperate moral perspective is exemplified by the 
difficulties experienced in limiting treatment in adult ICUs. An 1984 OT A 
report on ICUs observed that 
it is now recognized that a significant number of deaths in the leu occur after 'no 
resuscitation' orders have been written. In two large medical centers, as many as 
40 to 70 percent of leu deaths occurred under these circumstances. In a large 
community hospita l, 19 percent of leu non-survivors had no hope of reco very 
a nd were in the leu solely for terminal care. In short . a substantial portion of 
leu care for nonsurvivors occurs after hope of recovery had been abandoned 23 
The failure to use ICUs in a prudent fashion has implications for health 
care as a whole , because ICUs account for a significant part of the health 
care budget, 15-20% of all hospital expenditures in the U .S. 24, around 
1/ 2% of the entire G.N.P. of the U.S . If, as the OTA indicates , many 
patients are in ICUs even though they have no reasonable expectation of 
recovery, their treatment in ICUs reflects an inability to set appropriate 
limits to the use of technology to conserve life. 
The ability to set limits can be enhanced by jUdging the likelihood of 
success (the spes salutis). With increasing accuracy, one can now 
determine correlations between physiological findings prior to and upon 
admission to an ICU and the likelihood of the patient's benefitting from 
treatment, i.e., surviving. The APACHE score (an acronym for Acute 
Psychology and Chronic Health Evaluation) first published in 1981 , and 
revised as APACHE II in 1985, offers a means of enabling such 
prognostication.25 By assigning patients points on the bases of 12 routine 
psychological measurements (made within 24 hours of admission), of age, 
and of chronic health problems, statistically predictive correlations can be 
made between patients' scores and their chances of survival. As a result of 
this and similar studies,26 one can now begin to determine in advance the 
circumstances under which the use of ICUs is likely to be effective. For 
example, intensive care does not offer a substantial chance of survival for 
people with high AP ACHE scores; indeed, for individuals with scores over 
40, the chances of survival asymptomatically approach zero. One the other 
hand, patients with APACHE scores of 10 or less may do as well in a 
non-ICU setting, at least in a step-down unit. 27 
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The difficulty in using such scores is that one will be wrong at times, 
albeit infrequently. But if the right to life were absolute, it would be 
unacceptable to be wrong even I % of the time. One would be obligated to 
admit on a first-come, first-served basis, and not to sacrifice on the altar of 
excessive burden the possibility of saving a life. However, if considerations 
of costs and likelihood of survival are of moral weight, the answers will be 
quite different. 28 If the average treatment cost of those who would survive 
is $10,000, then the cost of a life saved will be $1,000,000 (i.e. , on the basis 
of a I % chance of survival and an average cost of $10,000 per case 
treated).29 Such a cost may quite correctly appear excessive. Though much 
work still remains to be done in improving the predictive accuracy of 
clinimetrics such as APACHE, their successors are likely to provide us 
with the data which can guide health care policy if we have the proper 
moral perspective. 
The traditional Catholic distinction offers a moral framework for 
limiting the use of ICU s for patients with high AP ACHE scores, or with 
low scores, as well as for asking when the quality of life preserved in the 
case of patients is unlikely to justify the costs of treatment in intensive care 
units . The moral understanding that one is obliged only to use ordinary 
means which constitute a non-excessive burden and offer a reasonable 
likelihood of a healthy life, unlike a utilitarian calculus, places the 
preservation of human life in a contextual relation with per se goods such 
as eternal salvation. It thus allows an appreciation of why the good of 
merely living is not always morally overriding. The notion that 
extraordinary means cannot be obligatory, shows why creating practices 
that make the good of preserving life overriding, transforms the virtue of 
preserving life into the vice. Though the distinction between ordinary and 
extraordinary care was first applied to health care 400 years ago, its most 
morally important use may be in this century, and the nexPo 
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not to ignore the question of whether the custom referred to by the Holy See's council has 
become corrupt when it accepts as usual treatment that which would usually constitute a 
significant burden upon family, health care professionals, health care facilities, and third-
party payers. 
Cf. Kelly's remark: "I once asked the mother superior of a home for incurable cancer 
patients whether they used such things as intravenous feeding to prolong life. She replied 
that they did not. They gave all patients devoted nursing care; they tried to alleviate pain; 
and they helped the patients to make the best possible spiritual preparation for death. 
Many very good people with whom I have spoken about this matter think these sisters have 
the right idea - 'the good Christian attitude toward life and death" (op cit., p. 139). One 
could argue plausibly, pace Msgr. Griese, that Pope Pius XII's remarks cited above are in 
this spirit. For a recent study in this spirit , see N. Wray et a/., "Withholding Medical 
Treatment from the Severely Demented Patient," Archives of Internal Medicine, 148 
(September 1988), pp. 1980-1984. 
29 . In 1978, average hospital costs for 498 ICU patients came to $9,491 , compared with 
$1 ,361 for 118 non-ICU patients (J. R. Pamo, D . Teres, S. Lemeshow, R . B. Brown, 
"Hospital Charges and Long-Term Survival Versus Non-ICU Patients," Critical Care 
Medicine, 10 (1982), pp. 569-574). 
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30. I have benefitted greatly from H. T. Engelhardt, Jr.'s substantive comments and 
criticisms of several drafts of this paper. I am also indebted to criticism by L. McCulloch 
and Becky Cox White of the penultimate draft. 
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